Some managers are better than others. Based on the cognitive hierarchy framework of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004), we develop a structural econometric model that estimates the level of strategic thinking. In the model, firms with a high level of strategic thinking are more likely to correctly infer the expected actions of their competitors. We apply this model to the decisions by managers at 2233 Internet Service Providers to adopt 56K modems in 1997. We validate our model by showing that firms with higher estimated probability of strategic thinking were more likely to have survived through April 2007. We estimate considerable heterogeneity in the degree to which firms behave strategically and find that strategic ability affects technology choices. In particular, we simulate an increase in strategic ability and find that the diffusion rate of 56K modems falls substantially.
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Introduction
Some managers are better than others. This (perhaps unsurprising) fact is implicit in our teaching of business students and the widespread reporting of good and bad managerial decisions.
Nevertheless, while numerous papers model heterogeneous consumers in a variety of dimensions, management heterogeneity has remained relatively unexamined. This is not for a lack of models of strategic hetereogeneity. Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) develop a "cognitive hierarchy" model (henceforth CH) of heterogeneous strategic thinking where each player assumes that his strategy is most sophisticated.
1 They then provide considerable supporting evidence from laboratory experiments. In this paper, we develop the first structural non-laboratory estimate of management heterogeneity based on the CH model and apply it to the decisions of 2233 Internet
Service Providers (henceforth ISPs) to provide 56K modem technology to their customers.
The early market for ISPs provides an ideal case setting for examining heterogeneity in strategic thinking. As discussed in Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2007) , firms faced a clear, reasonably well-defined technology choice game between Rockwell Semiconductor's K56Flex modem, US Robotics' X2 modem, or not adopting at all. Many firms competed in a number of local markets. The dial-up nature of the technology means that markets are easily defined by local telephone calling areas. Perhaps because this was a new industry, large firms like AOL coexisted with very small companies run out of people's homes. MBAs and seasoned managers competed against recent computer science graduates who had helped run the modem pools at their universities.
This apparent heterogeneity in managerial expertise suggests that a CH model may have advantages over the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium approach typically used to estimate 2 simultaneous entry games such as this one. 2 In particular, the cognitive requirements of finding a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium on managers are substantial. For example, many advanced economics and management Ph.D. students fail to find the such equilibria on their examinations.
Adapting Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) used by players to assess competitor types. A useful consequence of this model is that equilibrium is unique: the existence of multiple equilibra is a common problem in simultaneous entry games (Seim 2006; Bajari, Hong, and Ryan 2004) .
Our model and data also allow us to go beyond the current laboratory research that suggest the CH model is a good one and find support outside of the laboratory. We find that those ISPs that are more likely to be high-level strategic thinkers are also more likely to have survived through April 2007. Furthermore, our estimate of the parameter that measures the distribution of strategic ability across the population is well within the range found by Camerer, 3 Ho, and Chong (2004) . Both findings provide some external validity to the use of the CH model in the context of ISP decisions to adopt 56K modems.
Overall, the CH model helps explain the variation in managerial decision-making in a useful way. As the first paper (to our knowledge) to combine behavioral game theory with the structural methods of the New Empirical Industrial Organization, our paper provides a new framework for understanding variation in the decisions of managers who face similar choices. This framework allows us to show how strategic thinking affects outcomes. We find that it slowed the diffusion of 56K modem technology, supporting Reinganum's (1981) theoretical work on the subject. More strategic managers are less likely to adopt new technologies because they anticipate lower profits due to competition. Furthermore, after controlling for heterogeneity in ability we find that the estimated incentives for strategic managers to differentiate from competitors are much stronger than the estimated incentives under the assumption that firms play Nash as in Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2007) .
This suggests an important difference between the diffusion of consumer products and the diffusion of business products: the likelihood of a given firm's adoption of a business product often depends on the behavior of other competing businesses. However, our results suggest that the importance of this effect is heterogeneous across managers with different abilities. For example, strategic considerations may be less important when the product is aimed at a new industry with inexperienced management than at a mature industry with lifetime professional managers.
Next, we review the two key papers on which this research is built: Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2007) provide the main data and the empirical setting, and Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) provide the basis for the model. In section 3, we describe our model and empirical strategy. In section 4, we present our results. Section 5 lists some limitations and section 6 concludes. competing ISPs' technology choices; (3) the set of players and markets is well-defined unlike many other entry-type games; and (4) the decisions were largely made over a 3-month period, a period short enough that a simultaneous game might be a reasonable model.
A Review of Two
Data and Summary Statistics
Our main data set is identical to that used in Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2007) .
Their paper provides a rich description of the data. We briefly describe some key aspects of the data here. The main unit of observation is the ISP. Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman used two ISP directories, theDirectory and Boardwatch, to collect information on ISP location (through the telephone numbers that could be used to dial in), 56K technology, and some features of the ISP. Table 1a provides descriptive statistics by market; table 1b provides descriptive statistics by   ISP; and table 1c 
Cognitive Hierarchy and Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004)
Suppose many players play a simultaneous-move game where each player's payoff not only depends on her decision but also depends on other players' decisions. Players therefore need to form expectations about what the other players will do. While many models allow players to differ in their payoff functions, they typically assume all players have the same ability to think through the game. Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) argue that this assumption is flawed.
They develop cognitive hierarchy (CH) theory to allow players to differ in their ability to think strategically. 4 We apply a CH model to our data on decisions by ISPs. 4 They show that CH works well in both the entry-type game examined in this paper and in a "p-beauty contest" game (Nagel 1995; Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt 1998) . In a p-beauty contest game, a group of players are each asked to pick a number from 0 to 100. The player who chooses a number that is closest to 2/3 the average of the numbers chosen by all players wins a cash prize. The Nash equilibrium prediction for this game is that all players will choose the number 0. However, data from diverse subject groups show that the Nash prediction explains first-period choices poorly in this game and the CH model predicts quite well (Ho, Lim, and Camerer 2006) . We mention the p-beauty contest game because of two studies using that game that also try to explain the distribution of the ability parameter, We interpret this hierarchy of rationality as heterogeneity in strategic ability. Therefore, type 0 managers do not consider competitors. They instead only consider the characteristics of their firm and the demographics of their market. Type 1 players best-respond to a situation where all their competitors are type 0, given their own characteristics. And so on. A key difference between CH and Nash equilibria is therefore that in CH models some players will be surprised by the behavior of their competitors because they did not carefully think through their competitor's choices.
"τ". First, Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2005) regress τ on demographic characteristics and show that higher quality education is positively correlated with τ. Second, Slonim (2005) shows that experience playing the game matters in predicting performance. 8
Model and Empirical Strategy
Single Market ISPs
In this section, we build on Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) to enable us to take the CH model to non-experimental data. Here, we regard each local branch of a multi-market ISP as an independent decision-maker, which means local branches of the same ISP make independent decisions and these decisions can be different from each other. In section 3.2, we add the constraint that all branches of a multi-market ISP must make the same choice. Figures 1a This specification differs from the typical definitions done in laboratory experiments. In particular, in order to take the model to data outside the laboratory, we use observable data to allow ISPs to be heterogeneous in ways other than strategic thinking. Augereau, Greenstein, and
Rysman (2007) show that ISP-specific characteristics and market-level demographics influence whether to adopt 56K modem technology at all and, if so, which technology to adopt. We therefore add the ISP-level and market-level covariates used in that paper. This means that, rather than choosing randomly, a type 0 player's choice is the one with the higher intrinsic value to that player, independent of competitor choices. Higher level players also consider the intrinsic value of each choice in addition to competitor behavior.
We assume that all ISP-specific characteristics and market-specific demographics are public information. Thus any ISP can observe the characteristics of all the other ISPs and can predict their behavior according to the distribution of types. Therefore, given market and ISP characteristics and the parameters of the model, the choices of type 0 ISPs are perfectly predictable up to the idiosyncratic error in the profit function. The choices of higher-level ISPs are consequently also iteratively known. [ | ]
We can calculate these probabilities by simulation. This leads to the following mapping relationships:
Finally, we can construct our likelihood function:
The single-market ISP method is an important building block in our estimation. We next turn to our strategy for addressing the fact that ISPs operate in many markets and that choices are consistent across markets.
Multi-market ISPS
In this section, we describe our full specification in which we model the decision for technology adoption at the ISP level rather than at the branch level. In other words, to be consistent with the data we constrain multi-market ISPs to make the same choice across markets.
The main idea is shown in Figure 1b and the process is as follows. We first calculate every ISP's branch level profits (or market level profits). Then we add them up by ISP to get the ISP level profits. Next we consider each ISP's aggregate profit maximization problem to determine its technology adoption decision. Then we map every ISP's decision to all its branches. We repeat this procedure to get every ISP's expectation about other ISPs' decisions conditional on it being of each possible type. We calculate the ISP's choice probabilities assuming it is maximizing profits conditional on it being of each type. Our estimated results are then the parameters and types that lead to choice probabilities that best fit the data.
To be more specific, suppose ISP j is a multi-market ISP with B branches in markets j 1 ,...,j B . ISP j's type distribution is a normalized Poisson one with one parameter τ i . As before, in our empirical implementation we estimate τ i as ln(τ i )=γ 0 +γx, where x includes the number of competitors, the percent of the population that lives in an urban area, the percent of the population that has graduated college (these three variables are weighted by market population), and the number of markets that ISP j served.
Then any type k ISP's prior beliefs about ISP j's type distribution can be represented by:
In other words, in any type k ISP's eyes, ISP j's type is 0 with probability ,, 1 with probability , …, k-1 with probability . For example, a type 2 ISP's beliefs about ISP j's type can be shown by:
As in the previous section, we define ISP j's expected profit functions in market i
conditional on its type by [ | ]
A ij
Since now the decision is made at the ISP level, we need to know profits at the ISP level.
A natural extension based on the previous section is: vivid demonstration of different type distributions with different values for the parameter τ . We can see that a higher τ is associated with a "better" distribution in the sense of first order stochastic dominance, or a higher τ means that the ISP is more likely to be a higher level player.
The model is identified because different levels of τ give different patterns of technology choice. We use the observed patterns of technology choice by ISPs in the data and match them to the predicted patterns based on different levels of τ. As in any likelihood model, the estimate will be the value for τ that best matches the data. Generally speaking, since we find that the benefits to adoption of a given technology tend to be smaller if a competitor has adopted that technology, τ will be higher in markets where we observe more differentiation and less adoption than expected from the ISP and market characteristics alone. Thus, without strategic thinking, the choice is similar to a bivariate probit of choice on ISP characteristics and market demographics.
The parameters of this bivariate probit can be thought of as determining the choices of type 0 players. Type 1 players take the choices of type 0 players as given and try to differentiate from them. If the characteristics of the type 0 players in a given market lead them to adopt one technology, then type 1 players in that market will adopt the alternative technology, or none at all.
Type k players take the choices of type 0 through k-1 players as given and try to differentiate from them. Therefore, the level of differentiation over and above own and market characteristics determines the distribution of types. The estimation of τ can be thought of as a Poisson regression of the distribution of types on a constant and some variables that determine τ. The parameters are identified off functional form and to the extent that some of the variation of the covariates that define τ are independent of the technology choice decision except through strategic ability. 
Our likelihood function, in contrast to that in section 3.1, is now defined at the ISP level:
We use a genetic "differential evolution" algorithm to estimate our likelihood function (Storn and Price 1997) . This method is a simple and efficient method for global optimization over continuous spaces. We combine this with a GHK simulator with 50 draws (we choose this number based on Monte Carlo evidence in Keane (1994) and elsewhere).
So far we have treated all ISPs' technology adoption decisions as simultaneous regardless of whether we observe them in July or October data. As Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2007) discuss, the descriptive statistics suggest this is a reasonable thing to do. For example, in Table 1b , over four times as many ISPs had adopted Rockwell Semiconductor's technology in October as compared to July. In a robustness specification, we treat the decisions made before July as exogenous. So, if an ISP had adopted one technology by July, this ISP only needed to consider whether to adopt the other technology or not in October. Of course, for those ISPs that had adopted both technologies by July, they had no technology adoption choice to make in October. Our previous analysis is still applicable to those ISPs that had adopted neither technology by July. We believe it is reasonable to assume all ISPs' technology decisions by July are public information and can be observed by each other. In order to reflect the influence of those exogenous decisions in July, we incorporate those decisions into the expectation formation process of all ISPs (except ISPs that had adopted both technologies by July because they had no new technology to adopt in October) and update their profit functions and choice probabilities accordingly. For example, if type k ISP j adopted technology A by July, its choice probabilities in October conditional on its type can only be
In summary, this section first built a structural model of ISP choices based on a CH equilibrium under the assumption that markets are independent. It then extended this model to the more realistic case where ISPs operate in many markets but adopt the same technology in each market. Finally, we discussed an extension that treats ISP choices before July 1997 as exogenous and therefore the simultaneous game in the model is only played by firms that had not adopted by that date.
Results
Model Estimates
In this section, we first confirm the results of Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2007) that firms typically differentiate from rivals in the main multi-market model. Next, we examine 20 the determinants of the strategic ability parameter τ. We then show that the main results are robust to a number of other specifications.
11 Table 2 presents the main results under a number of different specifications. Table 2a Column (1) uses four different characteristics of the ISPs and the markets they serve to define τ. The first thing to notice is that the results are broadly consistent with Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2007) . The coefficients and signs on ψ show that ISPs typically differentiate from their rivals. If an ISP has adopted the K56Flex then, all else equal, its competitor will be more likely either to have adopted the X2 or not to have adopted at all. Interestingly, our estimated level of differentiation is much stronger (in significance and relative coefficient magnitude) than the one estimated by Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman. Given the assumptions of the CH model, this is expected: low type ISPs may not differentiate effectively. These will be averaged with the others in the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium but will be modeled as different in the CH equilibrium. 12 We also find that the incentives not to adopt the same technology as a competitor are larger than the incentives to adopt the competing technology. This suggests that strategic thinking may lead to an overall decrease in adoption of 56K modems. We examine this idea in detail in section 4.3.
Next we turn to the determinants of τ. The results of column (1) suggest that firms that face more competitors, that operate in urban areas, and that operate in areas with more educated populations have higher values of τ. Operating in more markets is not significantly associated 11 For computational reasons, we limit the maximum possible steps of strategic thinking to five in the main results. We later show results allowing the maximum number of levels of strategic thinking to vary between 0 and 6. 12 The average log likelihoods in these models are of similar values to Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2007) .
The fit of our model is better than theirs when decisions before July 1997 are treated as exogenous (our column (5)) and worse when they are treated as endogenous (our column (4)).
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with strategic thinking level. 13 In other words, these types of firms' strategic thinking distributions first order stochastic dominate the other types of firms' strategic thinking distributions. These firms are therefore more likely to be of higher level players and thus behave more strategically. The result on educated population is consistent with Chong, Camerer, and Ho's (2005) result that laboratory subjects that attend a higher quality school are more strategic in the p-beauty contest game. Column (2) estimates the model where τ is assumed to be equal across all ISPs. The estimated τ is 2.46 (i.e. exp(0.90)). This is well within the range of values for τ found in Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) .
Columns (3) through (6) of Table 2a as well as Table 2b show that the results on the determinants of τ are generally robust to a variety of different specifications. Column (3) allows correlation in the error terms of the two profit functions associated with the two different technologies. Column (4) allows the benefit of adopting both technologies to be different from the sum of the benefits of adopting each separately. Column (5) shows that the results are robust to treating the decisions of ISPs before July 1997 as exogenous. The method used for calculating column (5) was discussed at the end of section 3.2.
Column (6) imposes the assumption that the decision of which technology an ISP adopts in each market is independent of other markets. The model and likelihood function for this estimate was discussed in section 3.1. The results show that having more competitors is still associated with a higher value of τ. Interestingly, more educated and urban populations are associated with lower values of τ under the single market ISP assumption. We believe this follows from the fact that firms in urban areas often operate in many markets. They therefore 22 will appear not to behave strategically because they are actually considering many markets in their decision of which technology to adopt. (7)).
The coefficient on number of markets served is negative and significant in this specification.
While we believe this makes sense because ISPs serving many markets may not be very sensitive to their rivals' decisions, we are hesitant to draw strong inferences from this result since it is not robust across specifications. Column (8) shows that the estimated value of τ, if it is assumed to be constant for all ISPs, is again 2.46. Column (9) allows correlation in the error terms of the two profit functions associated with the two different technologies and allows the benefit of adopting both technologies to be different from the sum of the benefits of adopting each separately.
The results in Table 2 assume that the maximum possible type for strategic thinking is five. Table 3 shows the results using different assumptions on the maximum number of types.
The main conclusion to draw from Table 3 is that adding type-six thinkers does not alter the results much in terms of either coefficients or log likelihood. It also shows that qualitative results change little as long as there are at least type 3 thinkers in the model. The results of Table 3 show that our assumption of a maximum type 5 thinker, made for computational reasons, does not alter the results.
Did high τ firms do better?
In this sub-section, we provide a test of the external validity of our estimates. It is important to note that we cannot explicitly test our model against the Nash equilibrium. We use this information in Table 4 to assess the correlation between the strategic ability parameter (τ) predicted from our model and survival through 2007. All four columns show the same substantive result: those ISPs that survived (through continued operations or acquisition)
have a higher value of τ. Column (1) shows uses our main model in Table 2a column (1) to predict τ. Columns (2) and (3) instead use the models from Table 2a column (4) and from Table   2b column (9), respectively. Column (4) repeats the regression in Table 4 column (1) but takes the ISPs that were acquired out of the data. Column (5) again repeats the regression in column (1) but treats acquired ISPs as having exited.
Overall, Table 4 shows that higher τ firms did better in that they were more likely to have survived for 10 years. We do not mean to say that the 56K modem decision itself led to survival. Instead, we argue that high strategic ability overall is likely correlated with observed 14 Haile, Hortacsu, and Kosenok (2003) suggest this type of validation strategy in their paper on the difficulties in estimating Quantal Response Equilibria using data from outside the laboratory. They show that many strategies for estimating Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (including Seim 2006 and Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman 2007) are equivalent to estimating Quantal Response Equilibria.
24 strategic behavior in the decision to adopt 56k modems. 16 Firms that survived had higher estimated levels of strategic thinking in this context, and therefore we argue that they likely had higher levels of strategic thinking overall. This correlation between survival and strategic ability, however, needs to be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive evidence in favor of our model.
It is possible that those variables correlated with estimated strategic thinking, τ, are correlated with survival for reasons independent of strategic thinking. Section 5 describes some limitations of the model in more detail.
Simulations
We next examine how different levels of strategic thinking may lead to different outcomes. Based on the coefficients of Table 2 column 9, Table 5 shows simulation results where the distribution of strategic thinking is allowed to vary. 17 In particular, the table shows the The table shows that as the strategic thinking parameter, τ, increases the number of ISPs that adopt both technologies falls and the number of ISPs that do not adopt either technology generally rises. The number that adopt just one technology first increases and then decreases.
Thus, as more and more ISPs consider the competition, only a small number of firms buy at all in each market, and those that buy either buy from Rockwell Semiconductor or US Robotics but not both. Strategic thinking slowed the diffusion of 56K modem technology. Still, had the players in the market been even more strategic (say, τ = 5) the simulations suggest that just 32 percent of ISPs would have adopted any 56K modem technology by October 1997, rather than 50% as suggested by the results in the fourth row.
In summary, the simulation results suggest that allowing for heterogeneity in strategic ability is informative in understanding variation in technology choices by ISPs. Competitive considerations slowed the diffusion of 56K modem technology; however, diffusion would have been even slower if the ISPs were more strategic (as might be expected as the industry matures).
Limitations
As in any empirical work, this paper has a number of limitations. First, we assume, rather than test, the CH model. While we provide some evidence of external validity, our model does not nest Nash equilibrium assumptions. Our goal has been to understand the drivers of changes in the ability distribution parameter τ, assuming that the model behind it is correct. We measure strategic ability as the number of thinking steps a firm goes through in order to differentiate from its rivals. Therefore two firms with different characteristics are expected to behave differently in the model in the probabilistic sense. We have to acknowledge that it is possible that the observed variation in managerial ability is simply variation in unobserved heterogeneity along other dimensions. And, while we find that ISPs with high estimated τ were more likely to survive (despite being less likely to adopt 56K modems) and the results on what drives the strategic ability parameter are intuitive, without a clear instrument that is correlated with τ but not survival this evidence remains suggestive. ISPs with more competitors that operate in educated urban markets are more likely to be strategic. Still, there are alternative explanations for our intuitive results and the correlation between having a high estimated τ and surviving. Therefore, we cannot say that the CH model is somehow "better" than assuming Nash behavior. In fact, our model does not consistently fit the data better than Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman's Nash equilibrium model. Instead, we argue that the assumptions of the CH model allow us to learn different things from the data than a Nash model allows.
Second, the empirical setting may differ from the model in ways that may affect the results in unforeseen ways. For example, multi-market ISPs may weight markets differently than our assumptions suggest. They may be forward-looking firms that consider future market changes that we cannot measure. There may be unobservable shocks to adoption costs or benefits that affect technology choice. For example, a temporary, locally focused, price promotion for one technology may influence our results on strategic behavior. Furthermore, although adoption takes place over a short period of time, the game we study is not truly a simultaneous game. ISPs may respond to each other's decisions quickly. Finally, it is also possible that some ISPs are playing a coordination game rather than a differentiation game. While Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2007) found that ISPs do not behave this way on average, if some ISPs are coordinating they will appear in the estimates to be less strategic.
Third, a somewhat restrictive assumption inherent in the CH theory is that each player thinks he is smarter than all other players. In other words, the CH theory precludes the possibility that players expect their competitors to be their equals in level of strategic thinking. However, if
we allow players to think rivals may have equal ability then this will result in mutually best response through infinitely many iterations, meaning the uniqueness of equilibrium advantage of using CH would be lost.
Conclusion
As the first paper (to our knowledge) to combine behavioral game theory with the structural models of the New Empirical Industrial Organization, our paper provides a new framework for understanding variation in the decisions of managers who face similar choices.
This framework allows us to show how strategic thinking affects outcomes.
We find that strategic thinking slowed the diffusion of 56K modem technology, supporting Reinganum's (1981) theoretical work on the subject. In particular, our results suggest that strategic thinking by some customers reduced modem sales for both Rockwell Semiconductor and US Robotics by roughly two-thirds. This substantial impact suggests that competitive considerations in technology adoption should be important considerations for managers of business-to-business products and for policy-makers trying to encourage technology diffusion. That said, it is also important for both managers and policy-makers to consider that there is variation in strategic thinking. Our simulations suggest that adoption rates would have been much lower if the average level of strategic thinking were higher. Generally speaking, in industries with inexperienced managers, competitive considerations may be less important for business-to-business marketers and policy makers to consider. This paper therefore builds on the rich existing literature that generally focuses on the diffusion of new consumer-oriented products (starting with Bass 1969; Mahajan, Muller, and Bass (1990) and Ataman, Mela, and Van Heerde 2007 provide useful reviews). Our results suggest two new variables that should be considered when a new product is aimed at businesses: the strategic consequences of the product for the targeted industry and the strategic ability of the players. The competitive considerations of business customers affect diffusion, and this is particularly important in industries with sophisticated, experienced managers. In this case, it may be most effective for business-tobusiness marketers to target just one firm in each market as the marginal returns to targeting further customers will be lower. Furthermore, our results also suggest that incentives of business customers to differentiate from competitors may hinder the creation of winner-take-all markets.
This paper has shown that estimating heterogeneity in managerial types is feasible and provides interesting insights. There are several opportunities for future work that builds structural econometrics models from the assumptions of behavioral game. We encourage future researchers to examine whether strategic thinking limits (or encourages) technology adoption in other industries and whether this impact increases as industries mature and managers because more experienced. Similarly, this modeling technique could be applied to data on entry (as suggested by Ho, Lim, and Camerer 2006) to explore how strategic thinking limits (or encourages) entry and how this differs across markets and over time. 
